Source: realclearworld.com

Xinfajia Editor's Note: This article insightfully points out that decisions of war are not made by certain special individuals. We can start from here and try to find out what social forces are behind the individuals involved in all the decision-making, not only with regard to wars.

Whether you're a neoconservative or a paleoconservative opinion writer, you can easily make the same mistakes when it comes to evaluating the formation of policy - particularly if you have no background in that line of work. Such is the case this week with Charles Krauthammer in the Washington Post and Daniel Larison at The Week, both of whom seem to be taking profoundly exaggerated views of the role of President Obama in shaping the current response in Libya.

Wars tend to be defined by the president who's in power at the time. But it's important to remember that wars don't merely occur at the whim of the president, nor are they always prosecuted by his design. The president is not a battlefield strategist - he evaluates the options presented to him by those who work under him (or, as one might say, "I was elected to lead, not to read"). Presidents don't answer an open-ended test in these situations - it's multiple choice, with the potential solutions outlined by those underneath them.

That's why in this case, I think the U.S. role in the conflict in Libya is not necessarily a reflection of Obama's Ivy League values or professorial attitude, as Krauthammer maintains - nor is it a purposeful "hybrid of the worst traits of the wars of George W. Bush and Tony Blair" as Larison argues. The truth of the matter is that the incoherent nature of America's policy toward Libya is not a sign of a direct fault with Obama the man. His "Ivy League values" aren't reflected in the way the United States has approached Libya any more than his knee jerk rejection of the policy doctrines of George W. Bush as a candidate have informed it.

Instead, I think those flaws are a degree away from the problems we're seeing in the administration's approach. They are weaknesses, known for some time internally, now being made apparent publicly in the inconsistent approach of the White House.

The signs are clear of an administration bickering with itself and its allies about which direction to take. As Karen Tumulty writes, "part of the confusion comes from the fact that the administration has shifted over the past weeks - from resisting military action, to leading the first assault, to positioning itself to hand over control to its partners. That seems to have left almost no one satisfied. Those who were urging Obama from the start to charge in - neoconservatives on the right; humanitarian interventionists on the left - say he dithered too long. Those who warned against yet another incursion into the Muslim world, particularly in a country where U.S. interests are limited, say he has been reckless."

Yet the distinction here is important: this halting, uncertain stumbling toward a poorly thought-through military engagement is a sign of Obama's failing as a Chief Executive, not as a Commander in Chief.

The problem here is the approach taken toward building a policy team. While Obama promised to engage a cabinet with a diversity of opinion and a broad spectrum of ideas and backgrounds, the effect of that has been to create serious factions within his administration; factions that struggle to come to agreement on the best course of action. The problem is easy to recognize, considering it's the same failing that has plagued Obama in other areas of policy, particularly when it comes to identifying the right course for economic solutions. The staff cannot agree on what's best, answers are getting more and more muddled and internal compromises and clashes are delaying the decisions the president needs to make. No matter the issue - foreign or domestic - we've seen this movie before, and we know how it ends.

The important point here, however, is to never make the mistake of thinking that a war is defined by one person's approach to strategy. It's just not an accurate approach to judging why nation-states do what they do; why some wars happen and others don't. There are always other factors involved, other individuals - and ignoring them leads to the false presumption that U.S. presidents are alone in defining what happens in the world, the champion riding at the head of the host, as if this is a conflict which pits Obama against Gaddafi, Bush vs. Saddam, Hector vs. Achilles.

This is not the way the world works. As Reinhard Meyers wrote on the false lessons of World War II’s inception:

The actors in the drama appear only as personified images, no longer as real persons. Those men with the stiff collars appear as the embodiment of character–types reflected in a momentous spectacle—the man of Munich, who confronts the armed might of Germany with an umbrella, draws back in terror and gives way, because he lacks courage and determination….The drama has a villain (Hitler) and a sinner (Chamberlain)—what more does one need to explain the outbreak of war in 1939, especially when the supporting roles are played by lesser villains such as Mussolini and Stalin, and lesser sinners like Beck and Daladier.

 
Let's not make the mistake of thinking the U.S. president is the only actor who matters. While the fault may in part lie with the administration he has constructed, as eager as some people are to define everything in the world according to him, there's a lot more going on here than just Barack Obama.